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Introduction 
Crises are increasingly recognized as complex problem with boundaries and scales of 
activity that are impossible to fully discern from each other. Pandemics spread 
through both person-to-person contact and international flight patterns. Wildfires 
burn at wildland-urban interfaces and through electricity delivery routes. Flood risks 
are exacerbated by climate change and upstream land use patterns. Layered in social, 
economic, technical, and environmental challenges, crisis management requires 
collaboration and coordination of actors from diverse governance systems, disciplines, 
even nations. Through these interactions, frameworks are built to anticipate and 
address crisis risk and vulnerabilities.1 
But these collaborations necessitate a level of information sharing that goes 
beyond what one person or disaster response agency can share with another. To 
support them, crisis managers are seeking new information and communication 
technologies (ICT) that facilitate collective, intersectional, and interoperable data in 
ways that make it possible to share each other’s strategies, processes, goals, and 
perspectives.2 By working with such ICT, crisis practitioners aim to better understand 
the crisis being faced, who has resources to address it, and how current perspectives 
leave gaps that create vulnerabilities. Engaged in this way, the ICT are kinds of 
infrastructures, with underlying abilities to sort, order, and connect as they bring 
disparate data into conversation.3  
This paper explores the implications of having interactions around crises 
progressively based in ICT, data, and their infrastructures. To do so, we examine a 
series of tensions raised by infrastructuring diverse data and discuss what they mean 
for conceptions of crisis risk, vulnerability, and resilience. First, are tensions that 
emerge when trying to provide an underpinning logic that makes data shareable and 
comparable. Second, are the dynamics that come from misunderstandings as crisis 
practitioners from different disciplines and cultures engage with each other through 
these infrastructures. Third are the tensions raised through the anticipatory conflicts 
between concrete data needs of a technology and the uncertainties of how crises 
 
1 Kathleen Tierney, ‘Disaster Governance: Social, Political, and Economic Dimensions’, Annual Review 
of Environment and Resources 37 (2012), https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-environ-020911-095618. 
2 David Allen, Stan Karanasios, and Alistair Norman, ‘Information Sharing and Interoperability: The 
Case of Major Incident Management’, European Journal of Information Systems 23 (June 2013), 
https://doi.org/10.1057/ejis.2013.8. 
3 Susan Leigh Star and Geoffrey C. Bowker, ‘How to Infrastructure’, in Handbook of New Media: Social 
Shaping and Social Consequences of ICTs (Sage Publications, 2010), 
https://doi.org/10.4135/9781446211304.n13; Geoffrey C. Bowker et al., ‘Toward Information 
Infrastructure Studies: Ways of Knowing in a Networked Environment’, in International Handbook of 
Internet Research (Dordrecht: Springer, 2009) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-9789-8_5. 
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unfold. Finally, we consider how these infrastructures stabilise crises to make them 
visible, actionable, and contestable. We argue that crisis communication requires 
reflexive perspectives, building into all communication practices mechanisms by 
which actors can be mutually responsive to each other. Our aim is to provoke those 
engaging with such tools to consider how risk, vulnerability, resilience, and the lived 
experience of crises are intertwined with the infrastructures that make 
communication possible. 
 
Research approach and methods  
This research builds on a mixed-methods approach that included observing and 
intervening in three multi-national research and innovation projects.4 These projects 
all aimed at developing ICT to improve cooperation and communication across 
national, jurisdiction, and institutional borders. Our methods focused on the creative 
activities that make the informational infrastructures—technological, social, 
organizational, political—work.5 Specifically, while the tools were being developed 
and tested, we examined the underlying infrastructures and assumptions about crises 
that were shaping why specific data was gathered and shared in specific forms.6 
Overall, our approach to this involved ‘staying with the trouble’ and working in the 
‘belly of the beast’ to look from the inside to understand (and influence) the what, 
how and why of design choices and actions.7  
These activities directly engaged with the technology designers and 
stakeholders. We intervened in their work, mediated between them and the crisis 
responders through the development of crisis scenarios. We encouraged hands-on play 
 
4 This work took place within three multi-year European Commission research and innovation 
projects aiming to design information technology platforms for transboundary data sharing and 
coordination in crises: SecInCoRe (Secure Dynamic Cloud for Information, Communication and 
Resource Interoperability based on Pan-European Disaster Inventory) which ran from 2014-2017, 
IN-PREP (An INtegrated next generation PREParedness programme for improving effective inter-
organisational response capacity in complex environments of disasters and causes of crises) which 
ran from in 2017 to early 2021; and STAMINA (Smart support platform for pandemic prediction 
and management) which runs from 2020-2022. 
5 Helena Karasti and Karen S. Baker, ‘Infrastructuring for the Long-Term: Ecological Information 
Management’, Proceedings of the 37th Annual Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences (2004), 
https://doi.org/10.1109/hicss.2004.1265077; Karen S Baker and Helena Karasti, ‘Data Care and Its 
Politics: Designing for Local Collective Data Management as a Neglected Thing’, PDC ’18: Proceedings 
of the 15th Participatory Design Conference 1 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1145/3210586.3210587 
6 Geoffrey Bowker and Susan Leigh Star, Sorting Things Out: Classification and Its Consequences 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000). 
7 Ellen Balka, ‘Inside the Belly of the Beast: The Challenges and Successes of a Reformist Participatory 
Agenda’ (2006), https://doi.org/10.1145/1147261.1147281. 
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with technological prototypes, experimented with sandboxing around previous 
experience, and directed concept mapping in workshops. We engaged together in 
“collective inquiry into matters of concern” to envision crisis management support 
structures.8 This included exploring how data travelled and was transformed, why 
design decisions were made, and what new links were forged along the way.9 
This work was complimented by semi-structured interviews with crisis 
responders asking questions about their experiences with collaborative and 
transboundary interactions. Interviews were also conducted with technology 
designers, asking questions about their design impetus, their assumptions of user 
responsibility, and what kinds of public goods they see resulting from a tool’s use. It 
was further enriched with observations at collaborative disaster response exercises, 
where responders were being trained on current or new systems intended to improve 
data sharing across boundaries. The work overall involved eliciting societal values and 
ethical assumptions that could arise through the design and use of the technology, as 
well as exploring different innovation potentials in response.10 
 
The logics of shared pictures: crisis data infrastructures 
Crisis management gets complicated when working across borders and organisations. 
For example, during wildfires, fire and police are often stationed at different 
command posts in order to maintain internal command structures and focus on 
unique priorities. They make separate decisions and inform the public about different 
aspects of hazards and risks. However, they are aware that the fragmented response 
and messaging that comes from these separate positions often leads to 
miscommunications between responders. It also leaves the public unsure of who to 
trust or how to act. To mitigate these critiques, crisis managers are increasingly 
investing in information and communication technology (ICT).  
Crisis ICT provide an infrastructure for different technology, data, and 
practices to interact. They make it technically possible to collect data and draw shared 
 
8 Carl DiSalvo, Melissa Gregg, and Thomas Lodato, ‘Building Belonging’, Interactions 21, no. 4 (2014): 
2403, https://doi.org/10.1145/2628685. 
9 Catelijne Coopmans, ‘Making Mammograms Mobile: Suggestions for a Sociology of Data Mobility’, 
Information Communication and Society 9, no. 1 (2006), https://doi.org/10.1080/13691180500519274. 
10 Peter-Paul Verbeek, Moralizing Technology: Understanding and Designing the Morality of Things 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011); Mariarosaria Taddeo and Luciano Floridi, ‘What is 
Data Ethics?’, Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society, (2016), 
https://doi.org/10.1098/rsta.2016.0360. Lucas D. Introna, ‘Maintaining the Reversibility of Foldings: 
Making the Ethics (Politics) of Information Technology Visible’, Ethics and Information Technology 9, 
no. 1 (2007), https://doi.org/10.1007/s10676-006-9133-z; Philip Brey, ‘Disclosive Computer Ethics’, 
ACM SIGCAS Computers and Society 30, no. 4 (2000), https://doi.org/10.1145/572260.572264. 
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pictures of the multi-sectoral and multi-national nature of a crisis’ cascading effects.11 
They support data interoperability, which creates pathways for crisis practitioners to 
engage with each other’s data without having to be immersed in each other’s cultures 
of risk. The hope is that by adopting these ICT, multiple agencies will be able to share 
more efficiently and effectively what they know about a crisis to build a common 
picture from which to work. By using everyone’s data to better understand what is 
going on in general and what everyone is doing in specific, those working through 
these tools can better foster collaborative relationships and address the unexpected. 
And, from that information sharing, they endeavour to make better policy, improve 
planning, and reduce risks to society. 
These ICT can assemble different types and sources of data to enrich pictures 
of crisis risk. Data sources range from satellites, drones, alarm sensors in buildings, 
fire tracking cameras, flood sensors, GPS worn by responders at the scenes or found 
within response vehicles. They can include demographic data, critical infrastructure 
layouts, and historical environmental data. This can be paired with planning data such 
as evacuation perimeters, safety zones, estimated smoke plumes rates, and hospital 
bed capacities. Put together, these data can help make what the responders call 
situational awareness of risk that can inform a common approach to a problem and way 
of working together. Through this, crisis practitioners can see risk, vulnerability, and 
resilience beyond what any individual can know, supporting simultaneously more 
holistic and diverse perceptions of what communities face during crises. 
Frequently taking the form of ‘common operating pictures’ and ‘common 
information spaces’, these tools layer, analyse, and merge information from different 
agencies to build pictures of a scene. For example, the Red Cross can see the fire 
perimeters from the fire authorities to plan evacuation centres, while police can see 
the evacuation centre locations as they become activated to know where to direct 
people. Crisis managers can use them collaboratively to make decisions, to understand 
each other’s strengths or resource gaps, and to improve joint sense-making.12 These 
ICT also support engagements with global networks of knowledge, by, for example, 
being able to get a researcher using a satellite in South Korea to point it at wildfires 
in California to enrich the view of responders on the ground.13 They create 
information infrastructures for communicating risk.  
 
11 Maximilian Mayer and Michele Acuto, ‘The Global Governance of Large Technical Systems’, 
Millennium: Journal of International Studies 43, no. 2 (2015), https://doi.org/10.1177/0305829814561540. 
12 Sarah Backman and Mark Rhinard, ‘The European Union’s Capacities for Managing Crises’, Journal 
of Contingencies and Crisis Management 26, no. 2 (2018), https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-5973.12190. 
13 Ann Majchrzak and Philip H.B. More, ‘Emergency! Web 2.0 to the Rescue!’, Communications of the 
ACM 54, no. 4 (2011), https://doi.org/10.1145/1924421.1924449. 
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However, what’s being infrastructured is not just data. Active decisions are 
taken to combine the complex awareness necessary for collaborative action with the 
capabilities of data analytics, modelling, and machine learning that underpin these 
ICT.14 Moreover, each series of data is based in a unique set of risk assessment 
practices, socio-political situations, informational gathering techniques, goals, and 
purposes. These practices inform what kind of data is looked for in the first place to 
situate crises.15 Combining them meaningfully requires anyone working with the ICT 
to actively negotiate and deliberate what that combined view includes. Through these 
activities, ICT become fundamental to how communication and governance of crises 
can and do work. 
 
Puzzling Together the Ontologies of Risk 
One way these infrastructures organise data together is through ontologies. In 
information and data science, ontologies are structures that represent the 
relationships between many distributed and different semantic resources in one 
domain, such as crisis response. Like complex network maps, they name and classify 
categories, as well as build relationships between concepts, properties, instances, 
languages, and norms.  
 An important side effect of this organising is that ontologies make 
conceptions of crisis temporarily stable. Ontologies act like formal representations, 
becoming standards, thresholds, and visual maps that get institutionalised and 
naturalized as they become incorporated into practices.16 They provide “a background 
against which things become seeable, sayable, and doable with data across borders.”17 
Working with these formalities helps spread norms, standards, and other mechanisms 
that support collective action.18 In the process, crises—grounded in uncertainty—
become describable, manageable, and governable. 
 
14 Geoffrey C. Bowker and Susan Leigh Star, ‘Work and Infrastructure’, Communications of the ACM 38, 
no. 9 (1995), https://doi.org/10.1145/223248.278461; Kim Fortun and Mike Fortun, ‘An Infrastructural 
Moment in the Human Sciences’, Cultural Anthropology 30, no. 3 (2015), 
https://doi.org/10.14506/ca30.3.01. 
15 David Ribes, ‘Notes on the Concept of Data Interoperability: Cases from an Ecology of AIDS 
Research Infrastructures’, in Proceedings of the 2017 ACM Conference on Computer Supported Cooperative 
Work and Social Computing, CSCW ’17 (New York, NY, USA: Association for Computing 
Machinery, 2017), 1514–26, https://doi.org/10.1145/2998181.2998344. 
16 Susan Leigh Star, 'Revisiting Ecologies of Knowledge: Work and Politics in Science and 
Technology', in Geoffrey C. Bowker; Stefan Timmermans; Adele E. Clarke; Ellen Balka, Boundary 
Objects and Beyond: Working with Leigh Star (MIT Press, 2016): 13-46. 
17 Jonathan Gray, ‘Three Aspects of Data Worlds’, Krisis, (2018), 1–3, 11. 
18 Tierney, ‘Disaster Governance: Social, Political, and Economic Dimensions’. 
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At the same time, this work to represent crises as interconnected data points 
is value-laden, political, and performative.19 Ontologies filter, select, and reflect 
information that make sense within an ICT’s computational logic and the human 
cultures that created that logic.20 As reverberated in the infrastructures and acts with 
the data, these formalities (at least partially) predetermine what information is 
considered useful and relevant to describe the properties of risk, vulnerability, and 
resilience.21 Communicating through them can prioritise certain ways of knowing 
crisis over others, grounded in specific value systems, guiding implicit biases around 
what is at stake and who matters.22  
 
Communicating risk and resilience 
It is well acknowledged among crisis practitioners that what risk means is not the 
same on two sides of a border, let alone two agencies in the same region. What 
questions practitioners ask and data they use to answer the questions differs. Even 
how they use the same data differs.23 Practitioners regularly noted that other agencies 
‘think in different dimensions than we do’, both in terms of the scale and the timing 
of a crisis. What is run by a fire brigade in one country can be carried out by civil 
defence in another location, by police in another, by Red Cross somewhere else.  
Differences even appear in root concepts of crisis management. Take 
‘resilience’ as an example. It is a broad umbrella term that covers how systems respond 
to stressors and survive disruptions. In hazard research, resilience includes survival 
and coping by reducing impacts, avoiding losses, containing effects, and minimising 
social disruptions.24 In humanitarian efforts, resilience is defined by building 
 
19 Sheila Jasanoff, ‘Virtual, Visible, and Actionable: Data Assemblages and the Sightlines of Justice’, 
Big Data & Society 4, no. 2 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1177/2053951717724477. 
20 Tarleton Gillespie, ‘Algorithmically Recognizable: Santorum’s Google Problem, and Google’s 
Santorum Problem’, Information Communication and Society 20, no. 1 (2017), 
https://doi.org/10.1080/1369118X.2016.1199721. 
21 Olga Kuchinskaya, ‘Twice Invisible: Formal Representations of Radiation Danger’, Social Studies of 
Science 43, no. 1 (2013), https://doi.org/10.1177/0306312712465356; Evelyn Ruppert, Engin Isin, and 
Didier Bigo, ‘Data Politics’, Big Data & Society 4, no. 2 (2017), 
https://doi.org/10.1177/2053951717717749. 
22 Noortje Marres and Carolin Gerlitz, ‘Interface Methods: Renegotiating Relations between Digital 
Social Research, STS and Sociology’, The Sociological Review 64, no. 1 (2016): 21–46, 
https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-954X.12314. 
23 Jaime Abad et al., ‘Comparison of National Strategies in France, Germany and Switzerland for 
DRR and Cross-Border Crisis Management’, vol. 212 (2018), 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.proeng.2018.01.113. 
24 Anne Tiernan et al., ‘A Review of Themes in Disaster Resilience Literature and International 
Practice since 2012’, Policy Design and Practice 2, no. 1 (2019), 
https://doi.org/10.1080/25741292.2018.1507240. 
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communities that are knowledgeable and healthy, organised, connected, with 
infrastructures and services.25 While not incommensurable, they shift the foci of action 
and governance, placing vulnerability in different social and political processes. 
These differences often lead to siloed approaches to crises. One responder 
described a time when a bridge failed on an isolated but busy road on the hottest day 
of the year. Response plans for a broken bridge centred the risk around the cars. Thus, 
only stakeholders related to traffic, road maintenance, and police were involved. 
While the bridge was under repair, cars piled up, and people were stuck in hot cars 
on a hot day, unable to divert. But because risk for these actors was defined by the 
movement of cars over a bridge; none of these actors thought to check on the people 
in the cars. Health services and local municipalities were not called in to help with 
providing water for dehydration and medical treatment for heat stroke, turning a 
broken bridge into a small-scale crisis. Indeed, many regional resilience forums (e.g., 
in the UK and Sweden) were established because of lessons learned from situations 
like these, where crisis management included ontologies of risks that were too 
narrowly defined.26 
Priorities for managing crisis risk similarly reflect ontological challenges.27 In 
Germany, responders will first attend to those in need of aid, then they will attend to 
the safety of the scene. The greater risk is to the immediate lives lost. In France, it is 
the other way around. First the scene is secured, then those in need of aid. The greater 
risk is to the ability to provide services. If the first responders are injured, then no one 
will be helped. In the United Kingdom, the aim is to remove all victims from the scene 
so both scene and person can be treated separately. Each practice of risk management 
has different data that is immediately relevant: data about who is where and in what 
condition; data about who has the capacity to provide aid to victims; data about 
movement and travel of victims and responders. Focusing on data about the scene, 
context, or broader picture each suggest different ontological orders.  
In one workshop, these differences became particularly salient. Practitioners 
from different disaster response agencies and countries across Europe had been asked 
to provide details about the data they collect during an active disaster response. One 
 
25 International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, ‘IFRC Framework for 
Community Resilience’, (2014). https://www.ifrc.org/sites/default/files/IFRC-Framework-for-
Community-Resilience-EN-LR.pdf 
26 Civil Contingencies Secretariat, ‘The Role of Local Resilience Forums: A Reference Document’, 
(2013), https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-role-of-local-resilience-forums-a-
reference-document. 
27 Allen, Karanasios, and Norman, ‘Information Sharing and Interoperability: The Case of Major 
Incident Management’. 
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question was on what data they gather relating to ‘people affected’. The final list 
produced included:  
Vulnerable people requiring specialist assistance 
People whose presence is not compatible with rest-centres 
People at risk 
People needing evacuation 
Number of victims 
Survivor information 
Fatality information 
People with disabilities 
Anyone needing to be rescued? 
Anyone still missing? 
Location of people at risk 
Trapped people? 
Not even the grammar (statement or question) was consistent across the 
practitioners. Each of these approaches to collecting information about who is 
affected engages different understandings of vulnerability. Each suggest different foci 
and priorities for action: the body, the scene, the jurisdiction. Focusing on trapped 
people shifts, in a nuanced way, the informational needs to the environment, to what 
needs to be done to access the individual live bodies. Focusing on people needing 
evacuating implies the need for health data and information about resources to secure 
the bodies to maintain that level of health. Focusing on fatalities suggests information 
about cause of death, person identification, and family contacts. What aspects should 
be most visible shift as the categories do, including who should be involved and what 
decisions need to be made. For example, revisiting the distinction between survivors, 
fatalities, and victims: 
If people affected are survivors, priorities include information on who 
can house them and how to feed them 
If people affected are fatalities, priorities include information about 
hazards, impacts, and body storage 
If people affected are victims, priorities include information about 
hospital networks and injuries 
While all the terms form a broad categorical comparison of people affected by crisis, 
choosing between terms is a bit like deciding if the glass is half full or half empty. Each 
communicate different valences of risk and resilience, suggesting different relational 
needs and positions with other concepts. The differences are culturally grounded, 
situated in specific events and places, and unstable over time and scale. The 
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opportunities ICT afford in communicating crises highlight the need for new forms 
of reflexive skills for those who work with such tools, to be able to acknowledge and 
critically consider the situatedness, positionality, and politics of this work. They need 
to reanimate the stability offered by the ICT.28 
 
Misaligned understandings 
Misunderstandings happen regularly as these data valences meet in concrete 
ontologies. While most European countries primarily work with a command-and-
control model that has three levels (strategic, operational, and tactical), the risk 
management decision responsibilities at each level are not consistent. For example, 
decisions taken by a tactical team in the Netherlands can be taken by an operational 
team in Italy. When responders from different places interact with each other, the 
same basic question keeps emerging: “why are you doing it that way?” Crisis managers 
regularly note how misunderstandings will happen, especially with the softer terms, 
like vulnerability, or language idioms, like ‘perfectly acceptable’. One described how 
the definition of ‘critical infrastructure’ is viewed quite differently by public agencies, 
political entities, and businesses. Even semantically, who is considered a ‘first 
responder’ or what role an ‘ambulance’ plays is not the same between countries, even 
within European civil protection structures.  
This is not limited to disaster terminology. As culture and language move 
across borders, descriptive names for geographical features can lead to misaligned 
understandings of how that name implies risks. This, in turn, can filter down into 
long standing crisis management practices. For example, Mike Davis describes such a 
situation as the Spanish travelled to the Americas and carried with them the name 
‘arroyo’.29 While arroyos are waterless most of the time, when it rains they not only 
transform into rivers but also are regularly flood, bringing necessary water to the 
surrounding plants and animals. Risk to life, here, is when flooding does not happen. 
When the Spanish came to the Americas, they applied this term to the features of the 
semi-arid west. However, when the English conquered the land, they wanted to 
translate everything to demarcate their claim. But in English there is no direct 
translation. The closest is ‘dry creek’. Creeks are defined by having water, emphasized 
by the need to put ‘dry’ in front. Yet, with this image, wet is normal and flooding is 
not. Risk to life, here, is when flooding does happen. Each term anticipates specific 
 
28 Rob Kitchin, ‘Big Data, New Epistemologies and Paradigm Shifts’, Big Data & Society 1, no. 1 (2014): 
2053951714528481, https://doi.org/10.1177/2053951714528481. 
29 Mike Davis, ‘Los Angeles After the Storm: The Dialectic of Ordinary Disaster’, Antipode 27, no. 3 
(1995), https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8330.1995.tb00276.x. 
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notions of crisis, one based in dry and one in wet. They suggest what is considered 
normal and abnormal, producing specific imaginaries for vulnerability and risk. 
 Such misaligned understandings affect who gets included in the crisis 
management process as well as who is benefited by those processes. In one disaster 
training exercise to practice for large-scale flooding, two actors were using flood maps 
as part of their analysis, one set of maps from an environmental agency and one set 
from a local utility company. Throughout the exercise, flood levels were 
hypothetically escalating. To explain the severity of the situation, an announcement 
about the flood levels made a comparison to historical data. It stated, ‘the flood has 
reached 1910 levels.’ Both actors quickly pulled up historical records of what was 
‘under water’ at that time as a reference for what was going on at present.  
 The category ‘under water’ was intended to be a common-sense way of 
describing parts of the city affected by water being on top of things it should not be. 
But what was marked as ‘under water’ on each agency’s map was quite different. The 
environmental agency’s map outlined land that had been recorded in 1910 to physically 
have water on top of it, consistent with expected flood zones. The actor could assess 
flood damage to buildings or who would need rescue. The utility company’s map took 
a different shape, extrapolating what current power infrastructure would be affected 
by the flooding in 1910. From that, the actor was able to assess who was more broadly 
affected by the floods due to, for example, electricity cuts. As a result, what the map 
delineated as ‘under water’ was a larger area than simply outlining whose homes were 
flooded, instead including homes affected by the flooding. Both “homes flooded” and 
“homes affected by flooding” are valid ways of engaging data to describe the impact 
of being under water. Each can be interpreted to disciplinarily appropriate ends.  
 Each actor expressed frustrations over how the other was neither aware of the 
differences nor understood how to communicate these differences. The nuances in 
how terminology was used overrode any work done in the broader exercise to assure 
everyone in the room that they each were working with good data and had accurate, 
shareable maps. Trust between actors was eroded. They did not really interact for the 
rest of the training exercise. 
Without skills to engage the communication tensions between diversity and 
inclusivity, it was hard for the actors to determine if what looked like a bad piece of 
data resulted from poor categorisation, poor data gathering choices, or just differences 
in good data types. These interactions demonstrate that how data should be folded 
into insights and decisions must be anticipated well before a GPS collects and sends 
data, before a satellite translates thermal sensors into pixel colours, before specific 
demographics are surveyed in order to even begin to make such assessments possible. 
Petersen and Gurzawska / Data in Crisis




Anticipation and reflection 
Crises happen because of what is not anticipated, because of what is not foreseen or 
planned for, because of what is structurally invisible. Understandings of crises are 
grounded in extrapolations from historical experience, which are used to stand in for 
relevant qualities of potential futures.30 But futures are filled with novel risks and 
unique vulnerabilities. Thinking about the future is key to crisis management, 
fundamental to preparing understandings of who needs to be supported, how, and 
with what at stake.31 Without anticipation, crisis management can enact memories 
and assumed vulnerabilities rather than looking forward to what a crisis may bring.32  
In doing so, it can prolong injustices that perpetuate crises.33 
To a great extent, infrastructuring crisis communication is also an act of 
anticipation, of reflecting in advance upon what is important to know about a crisis 
for all actors involved. Predefined relations and properties only go so far. Seeing 
resemblances between two different crises can make visible what is historically 
significant or who is most affected. But resemblances are arguments, arguments for 
what is really at stake in a disaster. They can unintentionally anticipate what can 
happen in the world framed as it is currently known, with the features of the present, 
instead of building an image with room for unknowns yet to come.34 
To make the data meaningful for crisis management, those working with the 
data need to make judgements in advance about what is valued or prioritised about 
the context and situation. All parties need to agree upon how to determine accuracy 
of the data, how that data can be of benefit to whom, what ought to be done in 
response to specific data, and who is responsible for those acts. This requires 
considerable reflexivity, awareness of assumptions and historical experience, and 
 
30 Spencer R. Weart, The Rise of Nuclear Fear, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012), 
https://doi.org/10.4159/harvard.9780674065062; Andrew Lakoff, ‘Preparing for the next Emergency’, 
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(2017), https://doi.org/10.1038/549433a. 
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ongoing negotiations about what risks exist, what vulnerabilities could be relevant, 
and what resilience intends to achieve. 35  
But it is very hard to anticipate what information will be available or relevant 
during a crisis, let alone what is needed for other agencies beyond your own.36 This 
became evident at a workshop with emergency responders to elaborate how 
transboundary ICT could work. Workshop participants were asked: imagine you had 
the perfect communication tool, what would it look like and what else would you need 
to make the tool work? As they worked this out, the discussions never arrived at 
details like categories, collaborations, or even what they’d use it for. Nor did they 
really formulate what their ideal tool looked like. Each time they tried to settle on the 
kinds of organisational knowledge and infrastructural connections necessary for such 
an imaginary tool to work, they would consistently have to move backwards in time, 
to earlier steps that had to be in place for their configurations to work.  
For example, to get the data they wanted, policies had to be in place to support 
the data gathering for public use. These policies required there to be already existing 
political relations and contracts necessary to get access to the data, store it, and use it 
for various purposes. To gain political will, efforts to build public trust had to already 
be in place prior to the political relations and contracts. Well in advance of this trust 
building, communication processes had to be established for each party to know even 
what kinds of interactions could be of value and where stumbling blocks might 
emerge. The future imaginaries for crisis and resilience started with activities that had 
to take place years prior to new data or new ICT being valuable parts of 
communication.  
The implications of forgoing anticipation like this directly played out in a 
series of pilots to test newly designed ICT to support cross-agency crisis management. 
In an early pilot, the crisis practitioners quite liked the tools but realised the local 
data they had on hand fell short of making them usable. In a second pilot, the tools 
were not used at all; the data categories within them were all wrong for the crises 
scenario and did not match the data they had. Anticipatory lessons learned, before 
the next round more foresight work took place, with emails going back and forth 
between the responders and ICT designers for months in order to figure out what 
data should be included in the system to support the desired collaboration and 
coordination. However, even with the right data structures, the pilot participants 
realised they did not have access to the data to use within that structure. Two years 
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later, political negotiations were still ongoing with another public authority to gain 
access and build the necessary data arrangements. Anticipation in the past was a 
prerequisite to configuring crisis infrastructures in the future. Each new situation and 
context required forecasting of new data arrangements in addition to new crisis risks.  
 
The il(logics) of communicating crises 
These collaborative infrastructures piece together different perceptions of risk, 
different data valences, as well as different expectations and approximations of the 
world. Each carry with them ever-changing cultures of practice and histories of 
experience.37 Each configuration does different discursive work to make crises visible.38 
But it is not always possible to see such details in even the most well-structured big 
data, especially when it comes from across a border.39 As ICT are geared up to 
communicate risks, they stand in friction with the fluid and relational nature of how 
crises unfold, of how risks are emergent, and of the work necessary to make data 
shareable.40 
 When working at the intersection of multiple risk management practices, 
then, the challenge becomes one of choosing what kind of knowledge gets included in 
a system, without erasing all diversity and ambiguities for the sake of making things 
common enough for all. 
Is it a victim or a person at risk? 
Is it under water or not? 
Is it a threat or a new opportunity? 
Is it a duck or a rabbit? 
To substitute one for another for the sake of a common ontology raises questions, like 
who gets the power to define what is important about the particulars of a vulnerability 
and what is deemed meaningful to a describe a risk.41 These types of issues are 
unavoidable to some degree because information and communication technology, 
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particularly ones positioned as boundary objects, require alignments to work.42 
Coordinated acts need common reference points and structures within which people 
can find a way to relate new to familiar. 
 But, in providing this structure, ICT codify values, stating them as concrete, 
describable rules.43 As formal representations, they become evidence for why a piece 
of information is valid to consider or invalid towards a specific risk. They become 
underlying arguments as to why decisions being made using that information are 
relevant, proportionate, and inclusive.44 While focusing on alignment moves the 
negotiations more horizontal to include the needs and concerns of diverse actors, it 
still raises questions about what form such alignment should take.45 Should alignments 
be between crisis actors? At what scale of activity? Or should alignments be with 
specific communities or society as a whole?  
Using these tools focuses a crisis practitioner’s attention in specific ways. 
Infrastructures act as technical representations of responsibility, defining what makes 
‘good’ and ‘bad’ decisions.46  If one set of practices is prioritized over another in the 
design of data structures, collaborators from across boundaries can be unintentionally 
disenfranchised when they do not see their crisis experiences in the ‘good’ definitions. 
Even more, how data are approached and decisions taken during disasters can 
“reinforce, intensify and produce new and uneven stratifications” while leaving root 
causes for risk and vulnerabilities hidden within the formalities of data sharing 
structures.47 If a crisis responder or ICT assume specific identifiers for risk, 
vulnerability, and resilience then any inequalities that exist in less well represented 
features start to have greater weight and impact on how a crisis could unfold. 
However, choosing all schema for the sake of inclusivity risks muddled 
information leading to discord or confusion, such as the multiple ways of describing 
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‘under water’. The ability to assign value to the data is not determined by the data 
itself but by ever-shifting contexts and situations of use.48 Yet, actors are not always 
aware of their own assumptions, interests, and values when they decide upon how they 
structure and categorise data.49 Fear of losing control of a situation because of 
misunderstandings about how data from one framework should be used in another 
can easily transform inclusivity into a source of distrust rather than solidarity.50 
Specific skills are needed to not just interpret one’s own data but to ensure it is 
accurate, credible, and not misleading for others with whom it is being shared.51  
If those collaborating through these infrastructures are not able to relate one 
understanding to another or find synergies between different risk assessment 
frameworks, it becomes increasingly difficult to communicate why some data is 
included within a specific view of a crisis and others not. Responders need to know, 
for example, if relating their understanding of social vulnerability to another 
organisation’s data on infrastructural instability is an accurate and relevant 
association to make. To ask questions like ‘who could be the most vulnerable?’, ‘what 
could exacerbate a crisis?’, ‘how ought resources be distributed?’ and ‘who is 
responsible?’, crisis practitioners need to be able to also ask how societal challenges 
are framed within the data, by whom, and what rationales informed the forms the 
ICT have taken.52  
Each use of ICT needs to be paired with an actor’s ability to ask questions and 
contest what about a crisis is communicated. Just as much, each actor needs to be 
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mutually responsive to the diversity of institutionalised and established approaches 
being folded together.53 This does not come easy. After playing with one of these 
systems in a disaster training exercise, one responder insightfully noted: “they improve 
our awareness of each other, but we are not actually interacting.” The mechanisms for 
noticing difference and building dialogue were proving genuinely challenging to 
design and teach. 
Indeed, there can be great benefits to learning from different perspectives, 
helping to see what might be missed or biased in historical practices. Communication 
and data sharing practices have to take on new forms of reflexivity and adaptivity in 
order to make visible and engage with these logics. More specifically, the 
infrastructures need to support interpretive flexibility, so practitioners can best work 
with characteristics of crisis that are subject to situational, contextual, political, and 
social processes of interpretation.54 For this to work, those engaging through these 
infrastructures need help not only seeing what can be learned from others or what 
they might have in common, but also help in communicating difference.  
To do so, people need tools (in the broadest sense) to support noticing and 
critically thinking about how technology, data, and categories have politics and how 
that politics might affect others.55 This requires articulation mechanisms, methods by 
which actors are able to be aware of others, express difference, and align activities in 
the moment.56 These are practices that raise more than awareness; they raise 
engagement and reflexivity in relation to one’s situation of interaction.57 By 
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encouraging these kinds of communication practices, the infrastructures can shift the 
conversation from what we do to who we are.58 
Making this work means approaching infrastructuring in ways that include 
activities that take on a “more interpretative, intuitive mind-set.”59 These need to 
extend beyond questions that focus on the design of technology or communication 
practice to activities that more broadly treat infrastructuring as a way of thinking and 
approaching a problem. The data need to demand interrogation, explanation, and 
resolution in ways that problematise unspoken orders and struggles.60 They need to 
reabsorb human complexity.61 Just as much, the infrastructures need to support a crisis 
manager’s understanding of their unique responsibilities with the data and the ICT.62 
They also need to support different communicative acts with the data, from binding 
people together to defending a position. Building such situated yet reflexive 
infrastructures can help make visible why some values or orders matter more in some 
circumstances and to some people than others.63 In doing so, crisis ICT can become a 
means to share meaning as well as to build respect, to seek solidarity, and acknowledge 
differential impacts and needs. 
 
Conclusion 
As crisis practitioners work through ICT, the acts they take with data, in part, make 
the crises they are responding to governable.64 But in making data shareable, these 
tools are also sharing different stakeholder and societal interests that may overlap, 
conform, or conflict, relationships that shift depending on the scale of activity. 
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Through the data structures, different value and reasoning systems are pitted against 
each other, each vying for power and influence over how risks and responsibilities are 
defined.65 The differences between collecting data on trapped people instead of the 
number of people needing evacuation can be nuanced, but fundamental to how risks 
are defined, to how meaning is attributed to vulnerability and resilience, to who gets 
the privilege of resources, and to who remains unseen. The ICT become material 
manifestations of these tensions, offering insight into the broader and competing 
agendas at play.66 
They are also reminders that there are consequences for how we come to know 
the world.67 Data infrastructures and the categories upon which they function are just 
approximations of the world, helping those looking to pay attention in specific ways.68 
Seemingly mundane design decisions, such as to include one set of data relations over 
another, have the ability to both empower and disempower actors, embed a 
community’s values in a way that imposes them upon others, misalign two approaches 
to crisis management, or focus anticipation in a specific direction.69 Each time a new 
potential form of data interconnectedness is created through these information 
infrastructures, new contexts need to be narrated, new features of society need to be 
recognised, new qualities of risks imagined. Otherwise, data inconsistencies have the 
risk of being translated into societal vulnerabilities.70 
Communication in crisis requires that the data politics and data worlds be 
acknowledged.71 Doing so asks for a shift in focus from how data might be shared or 
infrastructured to produce a more complete picture, to how data and its use might be 
more responsive to diverse perspectives and potentially conflicting societal needs in a 
crisis. This offers an opportunity to use these tools, along with their collision of 
differences, misalignments, and unexpected configurations, as a way to better 
understand one’s own hidden values, assumptions, and historical experiences. They 
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are an opportunity to enrich the kinds of understandings that can make underlying 
causes of crises more visible. This also opens the potential to conceive of worlds 
different than one’s own situation, building an awareness that allows greater 
anticipation of crises in all their complexity.  
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